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TRANSFORMATION’S UNCONTESTED TRUTHS
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Strategic Studies Institute
Much of the literature concerning military transformation in the United States employs a
number of popular, but hitherto unchallenged clichés. Unfortunately, when phrases are repeated
frequently enough, they begin to sound true. In policy circles, where haste is often by necessity
the order of the day, that poor basis can suffice to justify any number of decisions. Clichés and
catchwords are merely handy ways of capturing and conveying truths; they may reveal a lack of
imagination on the part of the user, but they are hardly dangerous. Unsubstantiated clichés,
however, are another matter. They can masquerade as truths and, unless exposed in time,
ultimately prove costly and harmful to policy. Here are five of the more popular clichés, or
myths, found in transformation literature today, which are essentially baseless. Only by
regularly challenging the many “truths” we take for granted can we avoid wasting ever-scarce
resources, and keep our military transformation on course.
The first cliché is that military transformation is about changing to be better prepared for the
future, as if we could somehow separate the future from our current agendas, and as if we had
only one future for which to prepare. In fact, transformation is more about the present than the
future. We can only imagine tomorrow through the lenses we have available today; the future is
just as distorted by our biases and perspectives as is the past or the present. In effect, the future
is always plural, never singular. Each future will depend, as it must, on the tools, skills, and
biases of the individual forecasters. Yet, if forecasting the future is always affected by the
present, the influences of the present are not always bad. Without biases, much of the
information we receive would remain unintelligible. What we need, then, are the means and the
willingness to recognize our biases, and to test them—to filter our filters.
The second cliché is that strategic uncertainty is greater today than it was during the Cold
War. Unfortunately, this view overstates the level of certainty that existed then, while also
exaggerating the amount of uncertainty in evidence today. We should not forget the amount of
uncertainty that clouded conflicts in Korea, Indochina, the Middle East, and northern Africa, as
well as the invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis of 1963, the Munich crisis of
1972, the Suez crisis of 1973, as well as the many tense moments that attended the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Today’s uncertainty may be qualitatively different, but we can hardly
maintain that it is greater than that which obtained during the Cold War. We should also not
forget that what seems conventional wisdom now—the idea that a nuclear war would be
suicidal—was actually contested then by prominent and influential thinkers such as Herman
Kahn. In short, because we know the outcome of the Cold War, we find it easier to believe the
degree of uncertainty that existed during it was somehow less than it probably was.
As for today’s threats, we actually know a great deal about them, especially of transnational
terrorism, which has been under serious study for some time. Recent works by Peter Bergen,
Marc Sageman, Michael Scheuer, Bruce Hoffman, Stephen Ulph, and many others, have added,
and continue to add, to our wealth of knowledge. To this list, we must include the many
classified reports which have also contributed to our knowledge of terrorism in general, and of
specific terrorist groups. We know the demographics of these groups, their pathologies, the

values they hold, their goals, the conditions they need for success, their sources of support, their
methods, even though they continue to change, and in many cases their structures and innerworkings, even though the experts themselves do not always agree. Higher levels of knowledge
appreciate conflicting points of view, and seek to fit those views together into a larger mosaic.
The third cliché is that mental transformation is the most difficult part of any effort to change.
Actually, the most difficult part of transformation is the complex task of managing the change
itself. The ideas behind Gustavus Adolphus’ reform of the Swedish military during the
seventeenth century—which included mobile artillery and greater use of musketry—were not
hard to grasp. Likewise, Napoleon’s tactical and operational innovations—which involved
combining mass and firepower with self-sufficient army organizations called corps—were not
difficult to understand. Nor were the concepts implemented by the German military—which
stressed speed of movement and decentralized decision-making—difficult to comprehend.
If organizations appear reluctant to embrace new ideas, the fault might lie with the basic ideas
themselves. Proponents of change are not immune to seductive, but ultimately vacuous, theories
or jargon. Within the business community the rage of the 1990s was to transform to become
more networked, flatter, and more agile and flexible. Hierarchies and stovepipes were to be
demolished, and a premium was to be put on lateral information sharing. Such changes were to
enable companies to “self-organize” in innovative ways to accomplish tasks more effectively,
and more efficiently. However, recent observations show that many companies which were once
models of revolutionary change have come to grief: Enron, WorldCom, Vivendi, AOL Time
Warner, Qwest, Global Crossing, Sunbeam, British Telecom, Marconi, Tyco, and AT&T. While
the reasons for failure vary, an acceptance of “digital jargon” without rigorous, critical analysis
was a common factor. It might pay to examine the emperor’s new clothes before deciding to
change the fashion line.
In fact, the truly hard part about change is managing the change. That requires backing up
vague visions and lofty goals with concrete programs that can provide meaningful resources for
new roles and functions, and offering incentives or compensation packages capable of appeasing
institutional interests, especially the specific interests of those groups or communities most
threatened by change.
The forth cliché is that imagination and creative thinking are critical for any successful
transformation. While these qualities are certainly important, they are only vital when the effort
is open-ended, or in its early stages. Once the transformation effort gains momentum, a new
orthodoxy replaces the old one, and creative thinking, unless it remains “in the box,” becomes
inconvenient. To be sure, creative thinking can generate a wealth of potential solutions to the
practical problems and the incidental friction that come with implementing change. However, it
is the next step, the critical analysis of those solutions, the examination of their feasibility, that is
absolutely essential to moving forward. The only truly essential key to transforming successfully
is the capacity for critical analysis. Critical thinking also enables us to challenge clichés and
assumptions, to expose vacuous theories and seductive jargon, and, in theory at least, to assess
the results of war games and other exercises impartially. The desire to change an organization
thoroughly and rapidly can render it vulnerable to seductive theories. The purpose of critical
thinking is to strip away the allure. Critical thinking also assists us in identifying signposts,
which in turn are essential in enabling an organization to hedge its bets about how the future will
unfold. Signposts in the form of political, social, and technological developments can indicate
whether an organization’s assumptions remain valid. They can serve as decision points, which
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require policymakers to take hedging or shaping actions; the former minimize the damage of
failed assumptions, while the latter help us to prevent the assumption from failing in the first
place.
Finally, the last cliché is that militaries tend to transform slowly, or not at all, because they
like to “refight the last war,” rather than preparing for the next one. While militaries tend to rely
on historical models almost to a fault, organizations need to learn from their experiences; this is
particularly true of organizations that lay claim to the status of professions. Such organizations,
according to current theory, must cultivate a corpus of knowledge, usually historically derived,
which the members of the profession must master to qualify as professionals. To be sure, at
some point looking backward prevents looking ahead. Yet, to suggest militaries should not
examine the lessons from the last war implies they should not learn from their pasts. History
does not necessarily occur in cycles. So, failure to learn from the past does not necessarily
condemn one to repeat it, or to fail in the future. Yet, an organization that cannot, or will not,
learn from its past is not likely to prepare itself very well for the future either, except by chance.
Assessing what worked and what did not from historical data is integral to critical analysis.
Learning from the past and preparing for the future require an ability to evaluate events as
rigorously and objectively as possible. The study of history, perhaps more than any other
discipline, can help develop the requisite critical thinking skills which underpin these abilities.
Admittedly, readers can easily find more than five such catchwords or myths running through
today’s transformation literature. However, the purpose here is not to address every particular
cliché, but rather to point out the need to challenge accepted “truths.
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